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INTRODUCTION
Although federal statutes prohibiting discrimination in
employment generally provide an employee who ultimately
prevails on the merits with a wide range of remedies,I there are
three reasons an employee may seek preliminary relief. First,
such relief will frequently accord more complete relief than will
final relief. Depending upon the circumstances, preliminary
relief may prevent loss of income during the period of litigation;
lessen or avert the humiliation and mental distress which may
result from discrimination; reduce or eliminate problems of
proving injuries and losses; provide an opportunity for the
employee to gain experience and to establish his or her compe-
tence; and avoid the intrapersonal conflicts which may result
from a displacement-type remedy. Second, an application for
preliminary relief may result in the prompt determination of a
crucial issue in the case. This may be particularly desirable
when the action is founded on Title VII or on the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, either of which ordinarily requires
resort to both state and federal administrative remedies before
litigation. Third, the granting of preliminary relief, both be-
cause of the reasons mentioned and the effect on the employer's
operations, will frequently enhance the employee's settlement
posture.
Unfortunately, the law governing interim relief in employ-
ment discrimination actions is surprisingly obscure. There are
a number of different types of employment discrimination ac-
tions and the availability of preliminary relief varies depending
upon the specific type of action involved. For example, Title
VII expressly authorizes the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to seek preliminary relief before it has
I The federal statutes referred to are: The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1974) (referred to as ADEA); the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1974) (referred to as EPA); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000c through 2000e-15 (1974) (referred to as Title VII); and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974) (referred to as Section 1981). These statutes prohibit
discrimination in employment on account of sex, race, religious preference, national
origin, and age. The author has explored the monetary awards available under several
of these statutes in previous articles. See Richards, Monetary Awards for Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment, 30 ARK. L. REV. 305 (1977); Richards, Monetary Awards in
Equal Pay Act Litigation, 29 ARK. L. REV. 328 -(1976); Richards, Compensatory and
Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 27 ARK. L. REv. 603 (1973).
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completed its administrative process; however it is questiona-
ble whether such relief is available to a private plaintiff at this
stage.2 Another complication is that even when preliminary
relief is available, it may be difficult to- identify the proper
standard governing whether such relief should issue. The tradi-
tional equity standard for determining the propriety of prelimi-
nary relief is sometimes reformulated or replaced by either a
higher or a lower standard.
These problems dictate the organization of this article.
The first section will discuss the several standards which have
developed for determining when a preliminary injunction
should issue and their application in employment discrimina-
tion actions. The second and third sections will consider the
various types of employment discrimination actions to deter-
mine whether preliminary relief is available and, if so, which
standard is.used to gauge the propriety of such relief.
I. THE STANDARDS FOR PRELIMINARY RELIEF
Before discussing the availability of preliminary relief in
particular employment discrimination actions, it is necessary
to consider the several standards which are used to determine
whether such relief should issue. Although it might be thought
that the propriety of preliminary relief is always determined by
the traditional equity standard, the present state of the law is
much more complex. In fact, it appears possible to identify five
fairly distinct standards: the traditional equity standard, the
reformulated equity standard, the extraordinary irreparable
injury standard, the statutory standard, and the All Writs Act
standard.'
Undoubtedly, the most familiar standard for determining
whether preliminary relief should issue is the traditional equity
standard. Under this standard, the court first determines
whether the applicant will suffer irreparable injury without
such relief. If this is the case, the court then balances such
considerations as the relative hardships to the parties, the ef-
fect on the public interest, and the applicant's likelihood of
2 See section II(A)(2) infra for a discussion of interim relief for individuals in §
706 proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1974).
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success on the merits in determining whether to issue prelimi-
nary relief.4 However, the traditional equity standard is no
longer used by all courts or, even where the standard remains,
in all circumstances.
The Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have
reformulated the traditional equity standard into a two-
pronged test, creating a second identifiable standard. Accord-
ing to these courts, a preliminary injunction should issue upon
a clear showing of either (1) probable success on the merits and
possible irreparable injury or (2) sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation
and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party
requesting preliminary relief.' Although it is not certain, this
reformulation of the traditional equity standard seems to make
preliminary relief easier to obtain by relaxing the probability
of success and irreparable injury requirements. In any event,
the Second and Ninth Circuits appear to regard this standard
as a refinement of the traditional standard, not as an alterna-
tive standard to be used only in particular circumstances.
If there are strong countervailing policies against the issu-
ance of preliminary relief, the traditional equity standard may
be abandoned in favor of a third, more stringent standard. For
example, in Sampson v. Murray' the Supreme Court held that
a probationary federal employee about to be terminated in
violation of procedural regulations issued by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) can obtain preliminary relief pending an
appeal to the CSC only upon a showing of extraordinary irre-
parable harm. The Court devised this higher standard in recog-
nition of the reasons for denying any preliminary relief in such
a case: The traditional judicial reluctance to interfere in the
relationship of the federal government and its employees; the
See generally D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 108-11 (1973); J. DOBBYN, INJUNCTIONS IN A
NUTSHELL 150-61 (1974).
5 Aguirre v. Chula Vista Sanitary Serv. & Sani-Tainer, Inc., 542 F.2d 779 (9th Cir.
1976); Gresham v. Chambers, 501 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1974). The Sixth Circuit may also
use a reformulated standard. See Brandeis Mach. & Supply Corp. v. Barber-Greene
Co., 503 F.2d 503 (6th Cir. 1974). However, there is a later decision from the Ninth
Circuit which appears to have used the traditional equity standard. Jones v. Pacific
Intermountain Express, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1514 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,239 (1976).
6 415 U.S. 61 (1974). Murray is also discussed more fully later in this section and
in section lI(A)(2) infra.
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power of the CSC to award backpay and reinstatement; the
monetary recovery allowed for wrongful discharge by the Back
Pay Act;7 the CSC's claim that such relief would disrupt the
administrative process; the notion that probationary federal
employees have fewer rights than permanent federal employ-
ees; and the recognition that the challenge was to the procedure
used to discharge, rather than to the substantive basis for dis-
charge. The extraordinary standard also was applied by the
Supreme Court in Rizzo v. Goode,I a Section 1983 action seek-
ing judicial imposition of a procedure to review citizens' com-
plaints against police officers,9 because the principles of feder-
alism militate against federal court involvement in the internal
affairs of state government.
A fourth standard is that applied to "statutory injunc-
tions": When a statute authorizes a court to issue preliminary
relief for its violation, irreparable injury is "presumed" upon a
showing that the statute probably has been or will be violated.'"
While the statutory injunction doctrine does not appear to re-
lieve a court of the obligation to consider other aspects of the
traditional equity standard,1" it is clear that this presumption
of irreparable harm vitiates what is often the primary obstacle
to preliminary relief.'" Thus, statutory preliminary relief may
be obtained upon a lesser showing than traditionally required.
7 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1974).
A 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974) provides a cause of action against persons who violate
constitutional rights under color of state law. See generally Bristow, Section 1983: An
Analysis and Suggested Approach, 29 ARK. L. Rav. 255 (1975).
' EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1312 (9th Cir. 1976);
Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975); Murry v. Ameri-
can Std., Inc., 488 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 438 F.2d
935 (8th Cir. 1971); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co., 431 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969); EEOC v. Union
Bank, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 527 (D. Ariz. 1976); Davis v. San Francisco Mun. Ry.,
11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1397- (N.D. Cal. 1975); EEOC v. Del Rio Nat'l Bank, 12 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1668 (W.D. Tex. 1975); Scott v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 7 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1030 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
" One court has said that when a statutory injunction is applicable, the tradi-
tional equity standard is entirely displaced by statutory criteria. EEOC v. Union Bank,
12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 527 (D. Ariz. 1976). However, several cases cited in the
preceding note suggest the contrary. See, e.g., Davis v. San Francisco Mun. Ry., 11
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1397 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
,1 EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1312 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Finally, the All Writs Act authorizes federal courts to issue
"all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law.' 3 In FTC v. Dean Foods Co.,14 which is more fully dis-
cussed below,"5 the Supreme Court held that the Act allows a
federal court to issue preliminary relief pending administrative
proceedings when the court's jurisdiction might later be in-
voked if, in the absence of such relief, an effective judicial
remedy would be "virtually impossible."'" It is unclear whether
the analysis a court must undertake when preliminary relief is
requested under the All Writs Act is significantly different from
that required by the traditional equity standard. Yet, there
seems to be no doubt that an applicant would also have to
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the mer-
its.
Except perhaps for the All Writs Act standard, it is appar-
ent that the standards for measuring the propriety of prelimi-
nary relief have several common elements. The traditional eq-
uity standard, the reformulated equity standard, and the ex-
traordinary irreparable injury standard all incorporate the con-
cept of "irreparable injury." Similarly, all the standards seem
to include the concepts of the probability of success on the
merits, the effect on the public interest, and the balancing of
hardships. Thus, it is important to consider the meaning of
these concepts in the context of employment discrimination.
The starting point in considering the meaning of
"irreparable harm" in the context of employment discrimina-
tion must be the Supreme Court's decision in Sampson v.
Murray. 7 It will be recalled that in Murray a federal employee
was about to be terminated in violation of procedural regula-
tions issued by the CSC and sought interim relief pending an
administrative appeal. The Court decided that such relief was
available but could be obtained only upon a showing of extraor-
dinary irreparable injury. The Court then examined the harm
the employee would suffer if preliminary relief were denied and
,3 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1974).
384 U.S. 597 (1966).
, See section II(A)(2) infra.
, 384 U.S. at 605. -
17 415 U.S. 61 (1974).
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concluded that it would not amount to irreparable injury even
under the traditional standard, much less under the extraordi-
nary one. Therefore, an examination of the Murray decision
provides guidance as to the meaning of "irreparable injury" in
the employment context.
As summarized by the Court, the employee in Murray
attempted to establish irreparable injury by alleging "that she
might be deprived of her income for an indefinite period of
time, that spurious and unrebutted charges against her might
remain on the record, and that she would suffer the embarrass-
ment of being wrongfully discharged in the presence of her co-
workers." 8 The Court found the monetary loss would not con-
stitute irreparable injury since "it seems clear that the tempo-
rary loss of income, ultimately to be recovered, does not consti-
tute irreparable injury."' 9 As to her allegations of humiliation
and damage to reputation, the Court said that the alleged pro-
cedural irregularities would cause no significant loss to reputa-
tion and whatever loss did occur could be remedied by the
CSC's requiring compliance with its regulations.
In a footnote, the Court recognized that there may be
"extraordinary" cases where the circumstances surrounding an
employee's discharge would amount to irreparable injury. 0
While it found such cases difficult to define in advance, it
stated that they must be truly extraordinary and not involve
merely such routine circumstances as the employee's lack of
resources or difficulty in immediately obtaining other employ-
ment.
The Murray decision indicates that three questions must
be asked to determine whether the harm an employee will suf-
fer absent preliminary relief is "irreparable": First, whether
the injury can be adequately compensated by a monetary
award; second, whether the harm can be fully corrected by
posttrial equitable relief; and third, whether the harm is insig-
nificant. If the answer to any question is in the affirmative, the
applicant has failed to show irreparable harm.
Given the Murray approach, what is the likelihood that
"irreparable injury" can be shown in an employment discrimi-
,Id. at 89.
" Id. at 90.
Id. at 92 n.68.
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nation action? The reasoning of some courts, whether in reli-
ance on Murray or on traditional equity principles, indicates
that irreparable injury will be almost impossible to demon-
strate.2 1 These courts have emphasized that preliminary relief
is unnecessary when the relevant antidiscrimination statute
provides the court with broad authority to grant whatever
posttrial relief is appropriate if a violation is found. However,
other courts have issued preliminary relief, reading Murray
narrowly or finding exceptional circumstances which amount
to irreparable injury.22 Some of the factors these courts have
looked to are a clear injury to reputation,h a loss of unusual
fringe benefits,24 and the existence of a highly restricted job
market .2 Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the cases clearly indi-
cate that irreparable harm will be very difficult to establish in
most discrimination cases.
Although the argument does not appear to have been
strenuously advanced in a discrimination action seeking pre-
liminary relief, it would seem that an employee could establish
irreparable injury by showing that preliminary relief is neces-
sary to prevent him or her from experiencing psychological
injury, whether humiliation and embarrassment or more seri-
z Washington v. Walker, 529 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976); Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d
142 (3d Cir. 1975); Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1975); Jerome v. Viviano
Food Co., 489 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1974); Theodore v. Elmhurst College, 14 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 163 (N.D. Ill. 1976); McCullers v. City of Raleigh, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1034 (E.D.N.C. 1975); Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1265
(N.D. Ohio 1974).
22 Many employment cases, not all involving discrimination, are collected in
Schrank v. Bliss, 412 F. Supp. 28 (M.D. Fla. 1976). The Fifth Circuit, for example,
seems to have limited Murray to cases involving "civil service remedies." Parks v.
Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1975).
23 Wagner v. Long Island Univ., 419 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Assaf v. Uni-
versity of Tex. Sys., 399 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Keyer v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
397 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp.
1002 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
21 Schrank v. Bliss, 402 F. Supp. 28 (M.D. Fla. 1976); Keyer v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 397 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Assaf v. University of Tex. Sys., 399 F.
Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Ingram v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 10 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 870 (N.D. Ala. 1974). Compare Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975);
Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
25 Keyer v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 397 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Johnson v.
University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Pa. 1973). See Baxter v. Sharpe,
10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1159 (W.D. N.C. 1975). Contra, Wagner v. Long Island Univ.,
419 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.N.Y. 'i976).
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ous harm. Psychological injuries due to discrimination have
been widely recognized in law, providing the basis for equitable
relief in the school desegregation cases and monetary awards
in several contexts."8 Nevertheless, Murray certainly raises
doubts about whether such an injury can be considered
"irreparable" for the purpose of securing preliminary relief.
To determine whether psychological injury can be
"irreparable" under the Murray approach, let us ask whether
such an injury could be (1) adequately compensated by a mon-
etary award, (2) regarded as significant, and (3) fully corrected
by posttrial equitable relief.2 With regard to the adequacy of
a monetary award, there are two reasons such an award may
be inadequate. First, the particular antidiscrimination statute
upon which the employee relies may not allow damages for
psychological injury. For example, in a Title VII action the
monetary recovery may be limited to "back pay," i.e., lost
wages and fringe benefits." Second, even when such damages
may be recovered, the extent of such an injury and the sum
needed for fair compensation are impossible to determine,
which, of course, is a traditional basis for deciding that legal
relief would be inadequate." The requirement that the injury
be significant may preclude minor psychological injuries, such
as the humiliation and embarrasment resulting from a failure
to follow proper discharge procedures, from being considered
irreparable. But when the injury results from an act which
denies the humanity of members of the employee'sracial, reli-
gious, or sexual group, the injury cannot be regarded as legally
insignificant. Finally, regardless of the situation in Murray, it
25 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Recovery of damages
for mental distress resulting from discrimination has been allowed under various fed-
eral and state civil rights statutes. See Richards, Compensatory and Punitive Damages
in Employment Discrimination Cases, 27 ARK. L. Rav. 603, 607 (1973). The recovery
is compensatory and is not limited to severe or intentionally inflicted injuries. E.g.,
Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976); Hostrop v. Board of Junior
College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1974); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F. 2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973). But see
Stolberg v. Members of the Bd., 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
21 In fact, the Murray Court did not consider whether the plaintiff's humiliation
could be adequately compensated by a monetary award or corrected by posttrial relief.
Whether the Court would have made these inquiries had it regarded the alleged injury
as significant is doubtful.
Richards, supra note 26, at 611-16.
See D. DOBBS, supra note 4, at § 2.5.
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is very doubtful that a significant psychological injury resulting
from discrimination could be fully corrected by a posttrial
order. While such an order may reduce or eliminate the inju-
rious effects after the date of its issuance, there is no reason to
believe that it would fully correct the harm previously inflicted.
Thus, when the principles enunciated in Murray are applied to
a psychological injury resulting from discrimination, it can be
concluded that the injury is "irreparable."
It might be objected that preliminary relief cannot prevent
psychological injury because in most cases the discriminatory
act and the resulting injury will have occurred before such
relief is sought. This analysis is mistaken. Even when the dis-
criminatory act and the injury have already occurred, the pys-
chological distress will usually be continuing and may even
worsen with the passage of time, as when a wrongfully dis-
charged employee is unable to find other work. Therefore, pre-
liminary relief may well have the effect of preventing or lessen-
ing additional pyschological injury to the employee.
Although this analysis raises the possibility that there will
be psychological injury which warrants interim relief in many
discrimination cases, such injury should not be presumed.
Since some employees with discrimination claims may not suf-
fer or allege any psychological injury,30 an applicant for prelim-
inary relief should be required to produce evidence that future
psychological injury will be incurred in the absence of interim
relief. This should not impose an insurmountable burden where
such harm is likely. Since the discriminatory act will usually
have already occurred by the time the relief is requested, the
employee will be able to produce evidence as to how he or she
has already been affected and to estimate the future effects if
the relief is denied.
Other concepts, the balance of hardships and the probabil-
ity of success, however they are labelled, also play a crucial role
in the balancing process which determines whether preliminary
relief ,will issue.' The court must compare the injury the em-
See Fort v. White, 530 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1976).
" Cases involving the balance of hardships include: Washington v. Walker, 529
F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976); Gresham v. Chambers, 501 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1974); Miller
v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1351 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Johnson
v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Pa. 1973). Seegenerally D. DOsBS,
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ployee will sustain if preliminary relief is denied with the injury
the employer will sustain if preliminary relief is granted.12 In
addition, the court must consider the parties' relative chances
of prevailing on the merits. The more likely the employee is to
prevail on the merits, the less comparative injury he must show
to obtain preliminary relief.33 After all, the stronger the em-
ployee's case, the less likely the employer will suffer any legally
significant harm by the issuance of the order.
The comparison of the potential injuries to the parties
requires that the court make a practical analysis in light of the
circumstances of the case. The employee's injuries will encom-
pass such items as discussed in the context of irreparable in-
jury. Among the factors which must be considered in assessing
the potential injury to the employer are the competency of the
employee,34 the cost of retaining or hiring the employee,35 the
amount of the employer's assets,36 the employer's need to fill a
position,3 7 and the adequacy of a bond to compensate the em-
ployer for any losses.38
In deciding whether or not a preliminary injunction should
issue, the court must also consider the effect of such an order
on the public interest. Of course, the public interest is served
by effective enforcement of civil rights legislation.39 But issu-
ance of preliminary relief might also adversely affect the public
interest, such as when it would impair the effectiveness of a
state agency charged with the protection of the public safety."
supra note 4, at 52-54, which also discusses the "balance of equities." Cases involving
the probability of success include: Jones v. Pacific Intermountain Express, 12 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1514 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 12 Emp. Prac. Dec. 11,239 (1976);
Hochstadt v. Worchester Foundation, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,220 (1st Cir. 1976);
Washington v. Walker, 529 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976); Grubbs v. Butz, 514 F.2d 1323
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975); Gresham v. Chambers,
501 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1974).
32 Oburn v. Shapp, 393 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1975), afl'd, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir.
1975); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 12 Fair Emph Prac. Cas. 1223 (N.M. 1974).
- Ingram v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 10 Fair EmpI Prac. Cas. 870 (N.D. Ala. 1974);
Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
31 Wagner v. Long Island Univ., 419 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
35 Id.
~'Id.
Gresham v. Chambers, 501 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1974).
Wagner v. Long Island Univ., 419 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
McCullers v. City of Raleigh, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1034 (E.D.N.C. 1975);
Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 404 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
10 Washington v. Walker, 529 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976); Obum v. Shapp, 521 F.2d
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Employment discrimination cases also frequently involve
circumstances in which nonparty employees would be ad-
versely affected by the issuance of preliminary relief. Just as
the court must consider the public interest, it must consider
the interests of these other employees. One court has said that
preliminary relief should not be granted to prevent irreparable
injury to the applicant if the effect would be to inflict similiar
injuries on nonparty employees.' On the other hand, the Su-
preme Court, with regard to permanent equitable relief, has
made it clear that concern with the interests of other employees
should not be allowed to "frustrate the central 'make-whole'
objective of Title VII. '42 Thus, a court presented with a motion
for preliminary relief will have to balance carefully the inter-
ests of other employees against the purpose of Title VII. Essen-
tial in this process will be consideration of the applicant's like-
lihood of success on the merits and, should the applicant pre-
vail, the scope of the permanent relief which would be appro-
priate.
IX. PRELIMINARY RELIEF IN TITLE VII AND SECTION 1981
LITIGATION
Having discussed the several standards governing the issu-
ance of preliminary relief, it is now necessary to examine each
particular type of action for employment discrimination. The
purpose is twofold. It must first be ascertained whether prelim-
inary relief is ever available in that type of action. If prelimi-
nary relief is not foreclosed, an attempt must then be made to
determine which of the several standards governs.
In this section, consideration will be given to the problems
of preliminary relief in both Title VII and Section 1981 actions.
Section III of the article will consider such problems in cases
142 (3d Cir. 1975); McCullers v. City of Raleigh, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1034
(E.D.N.C. 1975).
"1 Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975). See McCullers v. City of Raleigh,
11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1034 (E.D.N.C. 1975). When the preliminary relief requested
by the employee would adversely affect the public interest or other employees, but
such relief is otherwise proper, the court should attempt to shape the relief so as to
avoid these undesirable effects. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir.
1972); Reed v. Lucas, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 153 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
42 Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 423 U.S. 814, 820 (1976).
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arising under the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act.
A. Preliminary Relief During the Administrative Phase
Sections 706 and 707 of Title VII and the administrative
regulations issued by the EEOC establish a number of prere-
quisites before an employee, the EEOC, or the Attorney Gen-
eral can bring an action on the merits in federal court." The
two with which we are presently concerned are the require-
ments that the appropriate state agency, if any, and the EEOC
must be given a period of time in which to act before suit can
be brought. Similarly, Section 707 establishes an administra-
tive period which must expire before a federal employee can
bring an action on the merits.44 Our concern is not with the
details of satisfying these requirements but with the extent to
which preliminary relief is available from a federal court during
these periods. If interim relief is available, attention must be
given to the standard which governs such relief.
1. Interim Relief for the EEOC or Attorney General in Section
706 Proceedings
Section 706(f)(2) of Title VII expressly authorizes the
EEOC, or the Attorney General when state employees are in-
volved, to seek preliminary injunctive relief prior to the conclu-
sion of the EEOC's administrative process. It provides:
Whenever a charge is filed with the Commission and the
Commission concludes on the basis of a preliminary investi-
gation that prompt judicial action is necessary to carry out
the purposes of the Act, the Commission, or the Attorney
General in a case involving a government, governmental
agency, or pQlitical subdivision, may bring an action for ap-
propriate temporary or preliminary relief pending final dispo-
11 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, -6, -16 (1974); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.1-.59 (1976). Many
of these prerequisites are discussed in Ganz, Santo, Wilsker & Pemberton, Litigation
of Employment Discrimination Cases, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY-
RESPONSIBILITIES, RIGHTS, REMEDIES 177 (Pemberton ed. 1975); Smith, Conditions Pre-
cedent to Suit, in HANDLING THE EMPLOYMENT DISCMINATION CASE 135 (G. Holmes &
Q. Story eds. 1975); Sullivan & Zimmer, The South Carolina Human Affairs Law: Two
Steps Forward, One Step Backward?, 26 S.C. L. REv. 1 (1974).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1974).
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sition of such charge. Any temporary restraining order or
other order granting preliminary or temporary relief shall be
issued in accordance with rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . .4
If the statute is interpreted literally, the EEOC cannot
seek preliminary relief until a charge has been filed with it and
the agency, on the basis of a preliminary investigation, has
determined that such relief is'necessary to effectuate the pur-
poses of the act." Since technically a charge cannot be filed
with the EEOC before the expiration of the state deferral pe-
riod,47 the requirement that a charge have been filed with the
EEOC would appear to mean that the agency cannot seek pre-
liminary relief under Section 706(f)(2) during such period.
Nevertheless, the EEOC has issued a procedural regulation
which takes a contrary position." The second requirement ap-
pears to mean that the EEOC must have concluded that the
charge has a sound basis in law and fact and that the employer
will 'persist in his unlawful conduct unless restrained. As the
statute indicates, this determination can be made after a
"preliminary" investigation and need not await a "reasonable
cause" determination.
The Section 706(f)(2) phrase, "pending final disposition of
such charge," constitutes a limit on how long the EEOC can
wait before seeking .preliminary relief. The Ninth Circuit has
held that an EEOC action under Section 706(f)(2) is untimely
when it is brought after a charging party has received a right-
to-sue letter and has filed a Title VII action, even though the
EEOC is acting pursuant to a subsequent charge alleging retal-
iation.49 A dissenting judge, who agreed with the majority as to
, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1974).
EEOC v. Union Bank, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 527, 530 (D. Ariz. 1976).
' In Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972), the Court indicated, in dicta, that a
charge may not be formally filed with the EEOC until completion of the state deferral
period. But see, e.g., Richard v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 469 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir.
1972).
4- 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(d) (1975).
" EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1312 (9th Cir. 1976).
In a similar vein' a number of courts have held that the EEOC cannot commence an
action on the merits after an action on the merits has been commenced by a private
party. However, the courts are split on this issue. Sullivan, The Enforcment of Title
VII: Meshing Public and Private Efforts, 71 Nw. U. L. Rv. 480, 499-500 (1977).
Nevertheless, a private party may commence an action on the merits after the EEOC
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the irrelevance of the retaliation charge being filed, argued that
the bringing of a private action does not mean that there has
been a termination of the administrative phase. In his view, a
termination occurs only when a charge has been dismissed,
voluntary compliance has been obtained, the EEOC has
brought an action, or the EEOC has decided not to bring an
action."
Although Section 706(f)(2) does not expressly state the
substantive standard for determining when preliminary relief
should issue, the courts have regarded the injunction as
"statutory, ' thus obviating the need to show irreparable
harm." When the Attorney General seeks such relief against a
state agency, however, it might be argued that principles of
federalism require the use of the extraordinary irreparable in-
jury standard. Such an argument should be rejected, however.
Nothing in Section 706(f)(2) or its legislative history suggests
that Congress intended different standards to apply depending
on whether the defendant is a state agency or a private em-
ployer. 5 Furthermore, the use of the statutory standard poses
no constitutional problems since it is clear that Congress can
override the usual principles of federalism when it acts to pro-
tect rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment . 3
If, as suggested, Section 706(f)(2) does not authorize the
EEOC to seek preliminary relief during the state deferral pe-
riod, it may be that the agency can rely on the All Writs Act54
as a basis for such relief. In FTC v. Dean Foods Co.,55 the
seeks preliminary relief under § 706(f)(2). EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
11 EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1312, 1316-19 (9th
Cir. 1976) (dissenting opinion). In an analogous context, several appellate courts have
held that final agency action is the decision whether or not to file suit. E.g., Zambuto
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,385 (5th Cir. 1977); Williams
'v. Southern-Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976); Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1052 (1976).
1, EEOC v. Union Bank, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 527 (D. Ariz. 1976) (alternative
holding); EEOC v. Del Rio Nat'l Bank, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1668 (W.D. Tex.
1975); EEOC v. Midas, Inc., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 719 (D.N.M. 1974). See EEOC
v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1312 (9th Cir. 1976).
52 See Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. Ray. 824, 873-74 (1972).
" See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 425 U.S. 902 (1976) and cases cited therein.
54 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1974).
384 U.S. 597 (1966). Dean Foods is discussed more fully in section 1I(A)(2) infra.
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Supreme Court held that the Act permits the FTC, in the
absence of statutory authority, to obtain preliminary relief
when necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the administra-
tive and judicial processes. Of course, since the statutory
scheme involved in Dean Foods did not, establish a state defer-
ral period or specify a procedure by which the FTC could ob-
tain interim relief, the case is arguably distinguishable. 6 Per-
haps these competing policies can be reconciled by allowing the
EEOC to obtain interim relief under the All Writs Act when it
can show that such relief is necessary to preserve the effective-
ness of administrative and judicial processes and that state
authorities are unable or unwilling to provide such relief.
2. Interim Relief for Individuals in Section 706 Proceedings
In considering whether an individual may seek prelimi-
nary relief in a Title VII action during the administrative phase
of his case, it is necessary to distinguish between (1) a case in
which there is either no state antidiscrimination agency in the
jurisdiction or in which any such deferral requirement has been
satisfied so that the case is properly before the EEOC and (2)
a case in which the state deferral requirement has not yet been
satisfied.5 7 While the law is far from settled, it appears that
preliminary relief is more likely to be available in the former
situation than in the latter.
a. When There Is No State Deferral Problem
Even when there is no problem with deferral to a state
agency, the problem of whether an individual can seek prelimi-
nary relief prior to the EEOC's dismissal of his charge or issu-
ance of a right-to-sue letter has caused the courts much diffi-
culty. The Fifth Circuit and several lower courts have held such
relief available. 8 The Ninth Circuit agreed with these courts
51 However, as pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas, the
statutory scheme did authorize the Department of Justice to seek preliminary relief.
384 U.S. at 617. The majority of the Court obviously did not think that this provision
precluded the FTC from seeking such relief under the All Writs Act.
17 For a discussion of the deferral requirement, see the articles cited in note 43
supra.
Drew v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit
later reaffirmed and perhaps extended Drew by allowing a federal employee who had
not exhausted his administrative remedies to seek a preliminary injunction. Parks v.
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but did so in an opinion whose significance is doubly limited
since the court noted not only that the later issuance of the
right-to-sue letter coupled with the filing of a supplemental
complaint cured any initial jurisdictional defect, but also that
a Section 1983 claim was joined with the Title VII action. 9 The
First Circuit, affirming a decision not to grant interim relief for
lack of equity, assumed, but did not decide, that such relief is
available."0 The Second Circuit, in an action in which an em-
ployee applied for a preliminary injunction a week after filing
with the EEOC, upheld the denial of the relief for lack of equity
without referring to the exhaustion issue. 1 The Sixth Circuit,
when presented with the issue, expressed doubt about the
availability of preliminary relief but denied the relief for lack
of equity.2 A number of district courts have held that such
relief is simply not available. 3
Brennan, 517 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1975), discussed in section II(A)(4) infra. Some courts
have read Drew narrowly, noting that, in fact, the employee had obtained a right-to-
sue letter before her complaint was dismissed by the trial court. E.g., Nottelson v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 397 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Collins v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
376 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Okla. 1974). However, since the Fifth Circuit's opinion did not
mention the issuance of the letter and purported to decide whether preliminary relief
was available pending EEOC action, it is most doubtful that Drew should be distin-
guished on this basis.
The district court decisions which have allowed preliminary relief include: Hochs-
tadt v. Worcester Foundation, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,220 (1st Cir. 1976); Baxter v.
Sharpe, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1159 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Hyland v. Kenner Prod. Co.,
10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 367 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 272 F.
Supp. 322 (S.D. Ind. 1967), rev'd and aff'd on other grounds, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1969).
Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975).
,0 Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,220 (1st Cir.
1976).
" Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974).
,2 Jerome v. Viviano Food Co., Inc., 489 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1974). Arguably, this
is an alternative holding since the state deferral requirement was also unsatisfied. The
issue was presented in a later Sixth Circuit case, but was held moot since the plaintiff
was entitled to a right-to-sue letter at the time the appeal was heard. Troy v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1975). Accord, Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 13 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 11,431 (7th Cir. 1977).
13 E.g., Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 783 (W.D. Wis.
1976), appeal dismissed, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,431 (7th Cir. 1977); Gellman v.
Maryland, 12 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. 1804 (D. Md. 1975); Gradillas v. Hughes Aircraft
Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 414 (D. Ariz. 1975); Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 397
F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Troy v. Shell Oil Co., 378 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Mich.
1974), appeal dismissed, 519 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1975); Collins v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 376 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
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The courts which have held preliminary relief available
have emphasized that such relief is necessary to fully protect
Title VII rights. Recognizing that Section 706(f)(2) allows the
EEOC to seek preliminary relief,64 these courts reason that,
because of the EEOC's huge workload, the EEOC simply lacks
the resources to determine quickly whether preliminary relief
is needed.65 In such cases, the employee's rights can be fully
protected only by allowing him to seek preliminary relief on his
own behalf.
The courts which have disallowed or expressed doubt
about the availability of preliminary relief have offered four
reasons: (1) The enactment in 1972 of Section 706(f)(2), which
allows the EEOC to seek preliminary relief prior to the comple-
tion of its administrative process, implies that no private ac-
tion for such relief may be brought; (2) permitting such a pri-
vate action would be contrary to the Title VII scheme of allow-
ing the EEOC an opportunity to conciliate prior to litigation;
(3) Title VII does not contain a provision authorizing an indi-
vidual to seek such relief; and (4) a right-to-sue letter or a
dismissal is a jurisdictional prerequisite for maintaining a Title
VII action, and a federal court cannot issue preliminary relief
in an action in which it lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits.6
While the argument for allowing an individual to obtain
preliminary relief prior to the completion of the federal admin-
istrative phase may appear strong as a policy matter, the ap-
parent absence of any established legal principle upon which
to predicate it might suggest that the arguments against the
availability of such relief are the more persuasive. However,
such a conclusion would be ill-founded. Not only are there
established legal principles upon which such preliminary relief
can be based, but the arguments against such relief lose force
when subjected to careful analysis.
11 See section II(A)(1) supra for a discussion of interim relief for the EEOC or
Attorney General in § 706 proceedings.
"5 The enormousness of the EEOC's backlog is discussed in Ashton, The Availabil-
ity of Preliminary Injunctive Relief to Private Plaintiffs Pending Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Action Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 Loy.
Cm. L. J. 51, 53-55 (1976). The author also notes that, as of early 1976, the EEOC had
sought such preliminary relief in only 21 cases. Id. at 53.




The most effective way to elucidate these points is by an
examination of two Supreme Court decisions, FTC v. Dean
Foods Co.67 and Sampson v. Murray,8 which discuss the availa-
bility of preliminary relief in analogous contexts. Each case
involved a plaintiff who, without statutory authorization,
sought preliminary relief prior to completion of administrative
proceedings, and in each case it was recognized that, in appro-
priate circumstances, such relief could issue. Thus, these deci-
sions establish the principles governing preliminary relief
pending administrative proceedings and refute both the argu-
ments that preliminary relief is unavailable in the absence of
specific statutory authorization and that a court may not issue
preliminary relief when it lacks jurisdiction to decide the mer-
its.
In Dean Foods, the Court was called upon to decide
whether a court of appeals, upon application of the FTC, could
temporarily enjoin a planned merger pending the Commis-
sion's determination of its legality under the Clayton Act. 9 The
Clayton Act expressly permits the Attorney General to seek
interim relief in district court 0 but is silent as to the FTC.
Another provision of the statute provides that an order of the
Commission can be appealed to the appropriate court of ap-
peals which can affirm, modify, or set aside such order.' The
FTC argued that the All Writs Act, which authorizes a federal
court to issue any writ necessary to aid its jurisdiction," allows
the appropriate court of appeals to enjoin a planned merger
upon a showing that such action is necessary to insure an effec-
tive judicial remedy should the Commission's decision be ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, interpreting the All Writs Act as
applicable "where an appeal is not* then pending but may be
later perfected,"7 held that the FTC can obtain interim relief
pending its administrative process "upon a showing that an
effective remedial order, once the merger was implemented,
would otherwise be virtually impossible, thus rendering the
'7 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
415 U.S. 61 (1974).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1974).
" Id. § 25 (1974).
7' Id. § 21(c) (1974).
72 28 U.S.C..§ 1651 (1974).
' 384 U.S. at 603.
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enforcement of any final decree of divestiture futile. '7 4
In Murray,75 the Court recognized that a probationary fed-
eral employee who is about to be discharged in violation of
procedural regulations issued by the CSC can obtain prelimi-
nary relief pending an appeal to the Commission upon a show-
ing of extraordinary irreparable injury. To be sure, the re-
quested relief was denied because the Court found the em-
ployee had failed to show even traditional irreparable injury,
much less the extraordinary showing required by the circum-
stances. However, the Court's failure to allude to the absence
of a statute authorizing preliminary relief in the case, as well
as the language in its opinion, indicates that the Court believed
that such relief was available pursuant to a court's inherent
equity power.
It does not appear that the "extraordinary irreparable in-
jury" rationale adopted in Murray was simply another formu-
lation of the "insuring an effective remedy" rationale used in
Dean Foods. Before deciding that interim relief was not fore-
closed in Murray, the Court rejected the argument that Dean
Foods sustained the availability of such relief. In contrast with
that case, the Murray Court stated that here the agency op-
posed such relief as disruptive of the administrative process
and, moreover, such relief was not shown to be necessary to
preserve either administrative or judicial remedies. Thus, it
appears that the availability of preliminary relief pending
administrative proceedings can be predicated either upon the
need to prevent an injury to the plaintiff or upon the need to
preserve an effective remedy.
Dean Foods provides strong support for the view that pre-
liminary relief is available to an employee with a Title VII
claim pending completion of EEOC processes when such relief
is needed to insure an effective judicial remedy. True, Dean
Foods was an action brought in an appellate court by a govern-
mental agency seeking to insure that both it and the court,
1, 384 U.S. at 605. Four justices dissented, arguing inter alia that since Congress
specified that the Attorney General could obtain preliminary relief and had failed to
act on subsequent proposals that the statute be amended to allow the FTC to obtain
such relief, it was clear that Congress did not intend for the FTC to be able to seek
such relief and that the All Writs Act comes into play only after the jurisdiction of the
court has been properly invoked.
75 415 U.S. 61 (1974). Murray is also discussed in section I supra.
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should an appeal be taken, would be able to effectively remedy
an unlawful merger. The employee's action for preliminary re-
lief, in contrast, would be brought in district court by a private
individual seeking to insure that the court can issue an effec-
tive remedy should he prevail in a subsequent Title VII action.
Thus, the two actions differ as to the nature of the plaintiffs,
the type of federal jurisdiction to be protected and, arguably,
the need to protect the administrative process. But these differ-
ences do not seem significant. The principle established in
Dean Foods is that the All Writs Act allows a federal court to
issue interim relief pending the completion of administrative
proceedings when such relief is necessary to preserve the court's
ability to issue an effective remedy should its jurisdiction at-
tach. Clearly, this principle should be applicable when prelimi-
nary relief is sought by an employee who has filed a Title VII
charge with the EEOC.
Similarly, the decision in Murray strongly suggests that
preliminary relief is available to an employee with a Title VII
claim pending completion of the administrative phase when
the employee can show sufficient potential harm. As previously
discussed,7" there were several cogent reasons to find that pre-
liminary relief was entirely foreclosed in the circumstances pre-
sented in Murray. Since these reasons were insufficient to fore-
close such relief, it should be available a fortiori in Title VII
cases where most of those objections cannot be made and where
the EEOC regards such relief as supportive of its administra-
tive process,77 substantive as opposed to procedural rights are
involved, and Congress has expressly entrusted the federal ju-
diciary with the responsibility for enforcing the rights in issue.
It is necessary to reject any argument that the EEOC's
ability to seek preliminary relief under Section 706(f) (2) either
precludes an individual from seeking such relief or provides a
basis for distinguishing Murray and Dean Foods.78 Interim re-
lief had been held available to individuals prior to the 1972
" See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
" In Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,220 (1st Cir.
1976), the EEOC filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the availability of prelimi-
nary relief to an individual during the federal administrative phase.
11 Section 706(f)(2) is discussed in section II (A)(1) supra.
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enactment of Section 706(f)(2), and the legislative history of
the 1972 amendments. indicates that preexisting case law was
not intended to be changed in areas not specifically covered.79
Moreover, the existence of a statutory provision establishing a
particular procedure by which an agency may obtain prelimi-
nary relief does not imply that the procedure is exclusive. In
Dean Foods the Supreme Court allowed the FTC, in the ab-
sence of statutory authorization, to seek preliminary relief
against the proposed merger under the All Writs Act even
though the Clayton Act expressly authorized the Attorney Gen-
eral to seek interim relief."
Even if it is assumed arguendo that Section 706(f)(2) was
intended to establish the EEOC as a "filter" through which all
preliminary relief must be sought, this should not foreclose an
individual from obtaining such relief where the agency has
been unwilling or unable to decide in a timely manner whether
preliminary relief should be sought."' The filter notion would
only preclude the private litigant from obtaining preliminary
relief when the EEOC has actually determined that the pur-
poses of the Act would not be served by such relief or when the
private litigant, without justification, has failed to seek the
agency's assistance in obtaining such relief.
Finally, the argument that preliminary relief must be de-
nied prior to completion of the federal administrative phase
because it would conflict with the statutory scheme of accord-
ing the EEOC an opportunity to conciliate prior to litigation
must be rejected. One c6mmentator has argued that there is no
conflict between allowing an individual to obtain preliminary
relief and the EEOC's conciliation function since the issuance
of preliminary relief would enhance the effectiveness of concili-
ation by preserving the status quo until the agency has com-
1' For an examination of the legislative history, see Sape & Hart, supra note 52,
at 845-46. The case referred to in the text is Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 272 F.
Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), rev'd and aff'd on other grounds, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1969).
" See notes 69-74 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this point in
Dean Foods.
11 In an analogous situation, the courts have rejected the argument that the EEOC
must have attempted conciliation before an employee can maintain an action. See the
articles cited in note 43 supra.
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pleted its process."2 But even if there is a conflict, Section
706(f)(2), which allows the EEOC to seek interim relief prior
to any attempt at conciliation," clearly manifests a congres-
sional policy that priority must be given to the full protection
of an employee's Title VII rights.
In summary, it must be concluded that in appropriate
cases an individual can obtain interim relief to protect his Title
VII rights during the period the EEOC is processing his charge.
This conclusion is based upon analagous Supreme Court pre-
cedents which hold that such relief is available under either the
court's equity power when necessary to protect an individual
from serious harm or under the All Writs Act when necessary
to ensure the availability of an effective remedy should federal
judicial jurisdiction be invoked. It is bolstered by analyses
which reveal that the arguments which have been advanced
against the availability of such relief are unpersuasive.
Since it has been concluded that preliminary relief is
available prior to the completion of the federal administrative
phase, it should be asked whether such relief is available even
before a charge has been filed with the EEOC (assuming no
state deferral problem) or after the EEOC has decided that
such relief would not further the purposes of Title VII. Unless
we erred in rejecting the "filter theory," the answer to both
questions must be in the affirmative. Just as an EEOC deter-
mination that there is no reasonable cause to believe that Title
VII has been violated does not foreclose a Title VII action on
the merits, 4 an EEOC decision not to seek preliminary relief
should not foreclose an individual from seeking such relief. A
contrary rule would be inconsistent with the congressional pol-
icy of assigning the judiciary the ultimate responsibility for the
protection of Title VII rights. Moreover, since such relief is
premised on the court's equity power or on the All Writs Act,
it is clear that the court, not the EEOC, must decide whether
preliminary relief is appropriate. Yet, must the EEOC be ac-
corded an opportunity to consider the charge and decide
"* Ashton, supra note 65, at 68. See Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d
1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972).
0 See section ll(A)(1) supra for a discussion of interim relief for the EEOC or
Attorney General in Section 706 proceedings.
" McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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whether it wishes to seek such relief before an employee can
seek preliminary relief? While it could be hypothesized that the
EEOC may be able to resolve promptly the matter without the
need for litigation or may want to become involved in a particu-
lar case, the reality is that the agency will very rarely, if ever,
be able to act on a charge by the time preliminary relief is
needed. Since such a filing requirement would be futile, it
should not be imposed. Of course, if an employee seeks prelimi-
nary relief before he has filed a charge, and the court decides
to issue such relief, the court should require a prompt filing as
a condition for continuing the relief.
b. When the Deferral Requirement Is Unsatisfied
Even if federal preliminary relief is available to an em-
ployee during the federal administrative phase, it would not
follow that such relief is available during the state deferral
period. The arguments for and against such relief can be suc-
cinctly summarized. In opposition to such relief, the congres-
sional policy of allowing state authorities the first opportunity
to resolve discrimination claims arguably precludes any federal
intervention prior to the end of the deferral period. While the
EEOC has promulgated a regulation allowing it to seek prelim-
inary relief during this period,85 an opponent can deny that the
regulation is authorized by Section 706(f)(2), which conditions
the EEOC's ability to seek such relief upon a filed charge, or
can argue that it is inconsistent with the policy underlying the
state deferral requirement.86 Even if the regulation is valid, the
opponent can contend that it is the sole means by which pre-
liminary relief can be obtained prior to the expiration of the
deferral period. Finally, it can be maintained that since many
state and local antidiscrimination agencies can seek or issue
preliminary relief, there is no need to allow an individual to
apply to a federal court at this stage.
The arguments in favor of allowing federal preliminary
relief to be sought are the same as when such relief is sought
during the period the EEOC is processing the charge: There is
" 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(d) (1976).
' See section ll(A)(1) supra for a discussion of interim relief for the EEOC or
Attorney General in § 706 proceedings.
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a need to fully protect Title VII rights by preventing irrepara-
ble injury until there is a decision on the merits and to ensure
that an effective judicial remedy can issue if litigation is
commenced in federal court. Even if the EEOC regulation val-
idly authorizes a Commission suit during this period, a pri-
vate action is still necessary since the EEOC's workload will
frequently render it incapable of prompt action. Moreover, as
previously mentioned, it can be inferred from the legislative
history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII that Section
706(f)(2), upon which the regulation is apparently based, was
not intended to provide the exclusive means for obtaining pre-
liminary relief.87 Finally, while it must be acknowledged that
preliminary relief will often be available under state law, there
may be cases where such relief is unavailable or inadequate,
e.g., where the state agency declines to act or fails to secure
such relief.
Although there is a Second Circuit decision in which in-
terim relief was denied on the merits without a discussion of
the apparent failure to comply with the deferral requirement,"
the few courts which have expressly considered the issue have
held or have indicated that preliminary relief is not available
in federal court during this period.89 However, these decisions
are not entitled to great weight because they were clearly influ-
enced by the belief that no relief is available to an individual
prior to the completion of the federal administrative phase. If
these courts had recognized that preliminary relief is" available
during the federal administrative phase, they might well have
taken a different view of the availability of such relief during
the state deferral period since, as noted, the same rationale
applies.
The most satifactory resolution of this problem would be
to allow the employee to seek preliminary relief in federal court
during the deferral period if he can show that such relief is
" See note 79 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII.
m Faro v. New York Univ., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afl'd,
502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974).
11 Jerome v. Viviano Foods Co., Inc., 489 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1974); Gradillas v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 407 F. Supp. 865 (D. Ariz. 1975). In Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co.,
13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,431 (7th Cir. 1977), the issue was held moot because at the
time of the appeal the employee was entitled to a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.
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needed and that he cannot obtain it from state or local authori-
ties. This approach is a reasonable accommodation of the two
Title VII policies of allowing the state the first opportunity to
resolve the claim and safeguarding the victims of unlawful dis-
crimination. The danger with this proposal is that a federal
court might carry it to an extreme by requiring the employee
to seek preliminary relief in a state court before applying to
federal court. The more reasonable application would be that
an employee need only seek the assistance of the state or local
antidiscrimination agency in obtaining such relief. If the
agency cannot or does not issue or seek such relief or if such
relief is inadequate for other reasons, the employee should be
held to have satisfied the proposed requirement. Such an appli-
cation comports with the general deferral requirement that an
employee need only file a charge with the state or local agency
before going to the EEOC.0
c. The Standard for Preliminary Relief
If preliminary injunctive relief is available to an individual
during the state deferral and federal administrative periods,
what standard determines the propriety of such relief? The
easiest case is when preliminary relief is sought pursuant to the
All Writs Act on the theory that it is necessary to protect the
court's jurisdiction. Then the applicant must show that, with-
out the requested relief, an effective judicial remedy would be
"virtually impossible" and that he is likely to prevail on the
merits."
When the relief is sought against a private employer and
is premised on the need to prevent injury to the employee, the
relevant standard is in doubt. A Ninth Circuit opinion suggests
that irreparable injury will be presumed from a showing that
Title VII probably has been violated.2 On the other hand, the
Fifth Circuit appears to use the traditional equity standard. 3
Neither opinion, however, can be regarded as definitive, since
" See the articles cited in note 43 supra.
" See section I supra for a discussion of the standards governing the issuance of
preliminary relief.
92 Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.6 (9th Cir. 1975).
See also Hyland v. Kenner Prod. Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 367 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
" Drew v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973).
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each contains serious oversights. The Fifth Circuit failed to
refer to its previous decisions holding the injunction to be sta-
tutory when an employee who has a right-to-sue letter seeks
preliminary relief under Section 706(g).1 The Ninth Circuit
failed to explain how a preliminary injunction which is not
specifically authorized by a statute can be statutory. And nei-
ther court mentioned the cases which indicate that preliminary
relief is statutory when sought by the EEOC in an action under
Section 706(f)(2).9
The preferable view is that when an employee seeks in-
terim relief prior to completion of the administrative phase, he
must satisfy the traditional (or reformulated) equity standard.
The statutory standard must be rejected since the only provi-
sion of Title VII which conceivably could be interpreted as
authorizing such relief is Section 706(g). Yet, the courts have
uniformly understood this section as applicable only when the
employee brings a Section 706 action, which requires comple-
tion of the federal administrative phase." The extraordinary
irreparable injury standard does not seem applicable because
of the absence of Murray-like circumstances.97 Thus, by de-
fault, the proper gauge is the traditional (or reformulated) eq-
uity standard.
When the basis for the injunction is potential harm and a
state agency is the defendant, the Supreme Court's decision in
Rizzo v. Goode raises the possibility that the extraordinary
irreparable injury standard should be used, at least when there
would be a comparable degree of intrusion into state opera-
tions. Notwithstanding this decision, the traditional (or refor-
mulated) equity standard should apply. The legislative history
of the 1972 amendments to Title VII suggests that when Con-
gress brought state employees under the Act it intended to
" See section II(B)(1) infra for a discussion of actions under § 706.
, See notes 51-53 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of cases which
indicate that preliminary relief sought by the EEOC under § 706(f)(2) is statutory.
" Indeed, if § 706(g) establishes a statutory preliminary injunction, it must also
authorize preliminary relief prior to the completion of the administrative phase, which
would resolve the fundamental issue which has divided the courts.
91 See section I supra for a discussion of the standards governing the issuance of
preliminary relief. In particular, see text accompanying notes 17-29 supra for a discus-
sion of Murray.
$A 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976).
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accord them the same rights as are accorded private employ-
ees." Since it is clear that Congress can override considerations
of federalism and state sovereignty when it legislates to protect
fourteenth amendment rights, ' this expression of congres-
sional policy should be given effect by the courts even in the
absence of express statutory language.
3. Interim Relief in Section 707 Proceedings
As originally enacted, Section 707 did not present the
problem of preliminary relief during a state deferral or federal
administrative period."' Since the Attorney General was au-
thorized to file a pattern or practice suit immediately after a
finding of "reasonable cause,"''0 it was not necessary to defer
to a state agency or to attempt conciliation prior to suit.' 3
When suit was commenced, Section 707(a) expressly provided
for the issuance of preliminary relief.' 4
The 1972 amendments to Title VIiI drastically revised the
pattern or practice procedure. The EEOC was given concurrent
authority to bring such suits and, effective in 1974, the Attor-
ney General's responsibility for such litigation was transferred
to the EEOC.05 Moreover, the Commission was instructed to
conduct pattern or practice actions in accordance with the pro-
cedure used in Section 706 actions.' To implement this man-
date, the EEOC has issued regulations relating to Section 707
actions which require deferral to state agencies and certain
administrative actions, including an attempt to conciliate,
prior to litigation.101
The incorporation of state deferral and federal administra-
tive periods into EEOC-initiated Section 707 proceedings
raises the problems of the availability of interim relief during
" Sape & Hart, supra note 52, at 848.
'1 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S.Ct. 2666 (1976) and the cases cited therein.
"I As enacted in 1964, § 707 consisted of only subsections (a) and (b). 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-6(a), (b) (1974). Subsections (c)-(e) were included in the 1972 amendments
to Title VII.
,o2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1974).
03 EEOC v. United Air Lines, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1592 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
104 2 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1974).
, Id. §§ 200Oe-6(c), (e).
,06 Id. § 2000e-6(e).
'' 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.54, .58 (1976).
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these periods and the appropriate standard for the issuance of
such relief. The first impression might be that Section 707(a),
which authorizes preliminary relief when the Attorney General
brings a pattern or practice action, provides or suggests the
answers to these problems. But there are two reasons why Sec-
tion 707(a) is not helpful: First, the section probably is applica-
ble only to the old pattern or practice procedure, i.e., actions
initiated by the Attorney General; second, even if the section
is applicable to pattern or practice actions brought by the
EEOC, it probably applies only in actions which are comm-
enced after completion of the administrative phase. Thus, in-
stead of referring to Section 707(a), we must turn to Section
707(e), which commands that the same procedure be used in
the new pattern or practice proceeding as is used in proceeding
under Section 706. In other words, the EEOC is able to obtain
preliminary relief during the administrative phase of a Section
707 proceeding to the same extent as in a Section 706 proceed-
ing.' 08
4. Actions by Federal Employees
Before a federal employee can commence a Title VII action
on the merits, he must wait until 180 days have passed since
the initial filing of his complaint or until there has been a final
decision on his complaint by his department or agency.' When
his department or agency has rendered a final decision on his
complaint, he may elect to appeal to the CSC before commenc-
ing an action.110 Unlike a nonfederal employee, who can request
either a state agency or the EEOC to seek interim relief during
the administrative phase if he is not able to do so himself, no
agency is empowered to seek such relief on behalf of a federal
employee.
The starting point in considering a federal employee's ac-
cess to preliminary relief must be with the Supreme Court
decisions in Sampson v. Murray"' and Chandler v.
'8 See section II(A)(1) supra for a discussion of interim relief for the EEOC in a
§ 706 proceeding.
I 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1974).
' Brown v. GSA, 96 S. Ct. 1961 (1976).
' 415 U.S. 61 (1974), discussed in more detail in sections I and lI(A)(2) supra.
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Roudebush."1 2 In Murray, the Court held that a probationary
federal employee who alleges that he is to be terminated in
violation of procedural regulations issued by the CSC can ob-
tain preliminary relief, pending an appeal to the Commission,
only upon a showing of extraordinary irreparable harm. In
Chandler, which held that a Title VII action commenced by a
federal employee after an unsuccessful appeal to the Commis-
sion must be tried de novo, the Court emphasized that Con-
gress intended to accord federal employees the same rights
under Title VII as other employees.
The Fifth Circuit, the only appellate court which has con-
sidered the issue, has held that a federal employee with a Title
VII claim may seek preliminary relief before he is able to main-
tain an action on the merits."' The court first limited Murray
to cases involving "civil service remedies." The court then rea-
soned that since it had previously decided that preliminary
relief during the administrative phase is available to nonfed-
eral employees"' and the congressional intent was to equate the
rights of federal and nonfederal employees, federal employees
must also be able to obtain such relief. However, finding that
no irreparable harm had been shown, the court denied the
requested relief.
The Fifth Circuit seems correct in holding that prelimi-
nary relief is available to federal employees prior to the exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies. If such relief is not foreclosed
in a case like Murray, it should not be barred when a federal
employee alleges that his Title VII rights have been abridged. 5
Moreover, assuming the correctness of according such relief to
nonfederal employees, 8 the congressional policy of providing
the same rights to federal employees as to nonfederal employ-
ees which was recognized in Chandler requires that federal
112 96 S. Ct. 1949 (1976).
"I Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1975); accord, Donald v. Ray, 377 F.
Supp. 986 (E.D. Tenn. 1974). Contra, Crenshaw v. Maloney, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
154 (D. Conn. 1976) (alternative holding).
,' Drew v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court's decision in Dean Foods suggests that preliminary relief
may be available to a federal employee under the All Writs Act even if it is not
available under the court's inherent equity power. See text accompanying notes 55-56
supra for a discussion of Dean Foods.
"I See the discussion in section II(A)(2) supra.
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employees also be allowed to seek preliminary relief during the
"administrative phase. Even if such relief is not available to
nonfederal employees, it can be argued that the Chandler
equality policy suggests that a federal employee would be able
to seek preliminary relief since Title VII expressly authorizes
either the EEOC or the Attorney General to seek such relief on
behalf of nonfederal employees.117
The Fifth Circuit also seems correct in using the tradi-
tional (or reformulated) equity standard to determine the pro-
priety of preliminary relief in such cases. Although Murray
employed the extraordinary standard, this higher standard was
used in view of forceful reasons to completely foreclose prelimi-
nary relief."' These reasons are inapplicable when a federal
employee seeks to protect his substantive rights under a statute
placing ultimate enforcement responsibility in the judiciary.
Moreover, as discussed previously,1 9 the traditional equity
standard apparently is controlling when a nonfederal employee
seeks preliminary relief prior to the completion of the adminis-
trative process. Since Congress intended to equate the rights of
federal and nonfederal employees, the same standard should be
used when a federal employee seeks such relief.
B. Preliminary Relief in Actions on the Merits
When a Title VII action is commenced after completion of
the administrative phase or when a Section 1981 action, which
does not have an administrative phase, is commenced, there is
no doubt that preliminary relief is available. The only problem
is to identify the standard which should be applied to deter-
mine whether such relief should issue. In considering this prob-
lem, it is again necessary to examine each particular type of
action which can be brought.
"I See Parks v. Brennan, 389 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ga. 1974), reu'd on other grounds
sub nom. Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1975).
"I See section I supra for a discussion of the standards governing the issuance of
preliminary relief. In particular, see text accompanying notes 17-29 supra for a discus-
sion of Murray.
"' See section II(A)(2)(c) supra for a discussion of the standard for preliminary
relief for individuals in § 706 proceedings.
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1. Section 706 Actions
When a Title VII action is brought either by the EEOC
after a finding of reasonable cause or by a nonfederal employee
after completion of the administrative phase, the courts have
disagreed as to the standard which should be used to determine
the propriety of such relief. The Fifth Circuit has interpreted
Section 706(g),120 which authorizes equitable relief if the court
finds the employer has committed an unlawful employment
practice, as authorizing preliminary relief upon preliminary
findings as well as permanent relief upon final findings."2 ' Thus
the court has concluded that irreparable injury should be pre-
sumed upon a showing that the statute probably has been vio-
lated. Other courts also appear to regard such relief as statu-
tory, although their opinions fail to mention Section 706(g) .122
In contrast, one district court, interpreting Section 706(g) as
limited to permanent relief, has expressly refused to follow the
Fifth Circuit and remarked that Congress knows how to estab-
lish statutory preliminary relief when it so wishes.'1' In addi-
tion, there are decisions from the Second, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits which have used the traditional equity standard in
.deciding the appropriateness of such preliminary relief. 24 How-
ever, the precedential value of these appellate decisions is weak
since each decision failed to consider whether such relief could
be statutory and emphasized that the employee had not shown
that he was likely to prevail on the merits, which is necessary
120 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1974).
121 Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970). Accord, Murry
v. American Std., Inc., 488 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1973).
"2 Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.6 (9th Cir. 1975);
Davis v. San Francisco Mun. Ry., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1397 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Scott v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1030 (S.D. Cal. 1973); Sims
v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 65, 353 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd and
remanded, 489 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1973).
" McCullers v. City of Raleigh, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1034 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
See also Theodore v. Elmhurst College, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 163 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
,24 Washington v. Walker, 529 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Pacific Inter-
mountain Express, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1514 (9th Cir. 1976); Faro v. New York
Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974). See EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n, 12 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1312 (9th Cir. 1976); Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975)
(dicta suggesting standards for preliminary relief same under Title VII as under §
1983); Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1265 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
Other decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuits suggest the reformulated equity
standard would now be used. See section I supra.
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even when a statutory injunction is involved.12 5
If, as seems likely, the Fifth Circuit is correct in concluding
that preliminary relief is authorized by Section 706(g), the sta-
tutory standard should be applicable whether the relief is
sought against a private employer or against a state agency.
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Rizzo 12 suggests
that the extraordinary irreparable injury standard may be ap-
propriate when preliminary relief is sought against a state
agency, it is clear that Congress can prescribe the use of a lesser
standard when it legislates to protect fourteenth amendment
rights. 127
2. Section 707 Actions
In considering whether a statutory or a traditional prelimi-
nary injunction is available in a Section 707 suit which has
been filed after completion of the state deferral and federal
administrative periods, it is necessary to distinguish between
the old and the new pattern or practice procedures. As origi-
nally enacted in 1964, Title VII authorized the Attorney Gen-
eral to bring a pattern or practice action after a finding of
reasonable cause. '12 However, the 1972 amendments provided
that the EEOC could also bring such actions and that in 1974
the functions of the Attorney General under Section 707 would
be transferred to the Commission.'29 Moreover, the EEOC was
instructed to conduct its pattern or practice actions in accord-
ance with the procedure used in Section 706 actions.110
Section 707(a), which was applicable in pattern or practice
actions instituted by the Attorney General, expressly author-
ized the issuance of preliminary relief.13' Quite naturally, there-
' See note 5 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the precedential
value of decisions from the circuit courts which have used the traditional equity stan-
dard in actions brought under § 706.
12 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
' See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976) and the cases cited therein.
'Z 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1974).
121 Id. § 2000e-6(c), (e). The Attorney General is no longer able to initiate pattern
or practice actions. United States v. Fresno Unified School Dist., 412 F. Supp. 392
(E.D. Cal. 1976); United States v. Garfield Heights School Dist., 13 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1142 (N.D. Ohio 1976); United States v. Pima County College Dist., 409 F. Supp.
1061 (D. Ariz. 1976).
"2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (1974).
W2I d. § 2000e-6(a).
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fore, the Fifth Circuit held the injunction to be statutory. '32
This decision later received an expression of congressional ap-
proval in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments.',,
With the transfer of the responsibility for pattern or prac-
tice suits from theAttorney General to the EEOC, the appro-
priate standard for interim relief has become less clear. Be-
cause of the requirement that the EEOC follow Section 706
procedure, it is doubtful that Section 707(a) applies to the new
pattern or practice action. But even if Section 707(a) is inappl-
icable and Section 706 is controlling, the injunction is probably
still statutory. As discussed in the preceding subsection, it ap-
pears that Section 706(g) establishes a statutory injunction
when the EEOC seeks preliminary relief in a Section 706 action
on the merits. '34
3. Federal Employee Actions
Although there are no decisions yet, a federal employee
who commences a Title VII action after an adverse decision
from his agency or the CSC is undoubtedly able to obtain pre-
liminary relief in appropriate cases. This is strongly suggested
by the Supreme Court's decision in Sampson v. Murray,'35
which recognized that a federal employee is not foreclosed from
such relief even in less compelling circumstances, and by
Chandler v. Roudebush,'3 which recognized a general congres-
sional intent to accord federal employees the same Title VII
rights as are accorded other employees.
The more difficult question concerns the showing that a
federal employee must make to obtain such relief. Although
Murray held that there must be a showing of extraordinary
irreparable injury, there are two reasons for believing that this
decision is not controlling: First, there were forceful reasons to
find such relief entirely foreclosed in Murray;131 second, Section
706(g), which appears to provide for a statutory injunction in
132 United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969).
'3 See Sape & Hart, supra note 52.
'3 See section II(B)(1) supra for a discussion of actions brought under § 706.
' 415 U.S. 61 (1974), discussed in more detail in sections I and II(A)(2) supra.
'u 96 S. Ct. 1949 (1976).
' See text accompanying notes 17-29 supra for a discussion of Murray.
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an action by a nonfederal employee, 3 ' seems to have been
made applicable to federal employee actions by Section
707(d).'39 This interpretation of Section 707(d) is bolstered by
the Supreme Court's recognition in Roudebush that Congress
intended federal employees to have the same Title VII rights
as other employees. Therefore, the statutory standard is the
proper one by which to gauge preliminary relief in an action by
a federal employee after completion of the administrative
phase.
4. Section 1981 Actions
The legal doctrine governing preliminary relief under Sec-
tion 1981 is clearer than that under Title VII.140 Because neither
the EEOC, the Attorney General, nor the states have a role in
Section 1981 litigation,4 the availability of such relief is not
complicated by deferral or exhaustion requirements or by the,
ability of an antidiscrimination agency to seek preliminary re-
lief. Procedurally, an employee simply files a Section 1981 ac-
tion and requests preliminary relief.
Since Section 1981 has not been interpreted as expressly
authorizing preliminary relief, the standard for such relief may
depend upon whether the employer is a private entity or a state
agency. In an action against a private employer, the traditional
(or reformulated) equity standard is applicable."4 However,
based on the Supreme Court's decision in Rizzo v. Goode, "I the
extraordinary irreparable injury standard will control when
interim relief is requested against a state and such relief would
"' See section II(B)(1) supra for a discussion of actions brought under § 706.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (1974).
14 Of course, since § 1981 is probably limited to discrimination based on race and
citizenship, its substantive scope is narrower than that of Title VII. See GINSBURG,
CASES AND MATERLS oN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 512-13 (3d ed. 1976); Larson, The Law of
Race Relations, 1969 WISc. L. REv. 470. Nor can § 1981 be invoked by a federal
employee. Brown v. G.S.A., 96 S. Ct. 1961 (1976).
"I See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
112 Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976); Washington v. Walker, 529
F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976); Obum v. Shapp., 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975); Douglas v.
Hampton, 521 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Gresham v. Chambers, 501 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.
1974). But see Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208, 1211 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1975).
1- 423 U.S. 362 (1976). See also Miller v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 11 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1351 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
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significantly intrude into the operations of the state.
Presumably, an employee who wishes both to obtain pre-
liminary relief under Section 1981 and to utilize the facilities
of a state agency and the EEOC could file a Section 1981 action
to obtain preliminary relief while his charge is pending before
these bodies.' If the EEOC dismisses the charge or issues a
right-to-sue letter, the complaint probably could be amended
to include the Title VII action."4 Should the EEOC file suit,
the two actions probably could be consolidated or, if the em-
ployee chose, he could dismiss the Section 1981 action.'
III. PRELIMINARY RELIEF IN EPA AND ADEA LITIGATION
Because of the close relationship between the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act (ADEA)' 41 and the Equal Pay Act
(EPA),"' the problems of preliminary relief under these two
statutes will be treated in the same section. The EPA is ac-
tually an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA)'49 and, therefore, is enforced pursuant to the provisions
of that statute. The ADEA, although a separate statute, incor-
porates the same enforcement provisions of the FLSA, albeit
with several important modifications.'50 Thus it is necessary
first to examine the problems of preliminary relief in EPA ac-
tions and then to consider the extent to which these conclusions
are applicable when preliminary relief is sought in an ADEA
action.
A. The Equal Pay Act
The FLSA establishes three types of actions which may be
brought to enforce the EPA: (1) A Section 16(b) action by an
" See Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1971); Gellman v. Maryland, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1804 (D.
Md. 1975). But see Shudtz v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,856
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
"I See Fan. R. Civ. P. 15(a). But see Shudtz v. Dean Witter & Co., 11 Empl. Prac.
Dec. 110,856 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
24 See FmD. R. Civ. P. 41(a), 42(a).
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633(a).
"' Id. § 206(d).
' Id. §§ 201-260.
, Id. § 626(b).
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employee to recover unpaid wages and liquidated damages; 5
(2) a Section 16(c) action by the Secretary of Labor on behalf
of the employee to recover unpaid wages and liquidated dam-
ages; 5 2 and (3) a Section 17 action by the Secretary of Labor
for equitable relief, including an order restraining the contin-
ued unlawful withholding of unpaid wages. 5 '
It will be observed that this enforcement scheme provides
for permanent injunctive relief only in a Section 17 action by
the Secretary. Such relief is not available in a Section 16 ac-
tion, whether brought by the Secretary or by an employee.54
Moreover, Section 11 of the FLSA expressly prohibits anyone
but the Secretary from bringing an action under Section 17.11
Although no cases have been found which discuss the
availability of preliminary relief in FLSA actions, the statute's
restrictive approach to permanent equitable relief seems to re-
quire that preliminary equitable relief be similarly limited.
More specifically; since permanent equitable relief is not avail-
able in a Section 16 action,. preliminary relief should not be
available in such an action. On the other hand, since the Secre-
tary may seek permanent equitable relief in a Section 17 ac-
tion, he should also be able to seek preliminary relief in such
an action. Indeed, given its broad wording, Section 17 can be
interpreted as authorizing preliminary as well as permanent
equitable relief.5 '
If Section 17 does authorize preliminary relief in an action
by the Secretary, the injunction must be regarded as statutory
and irreparable harm should be presumed upon a showing that
the EPA probably has been violated.5 7 If, however, Section 17
is not interpreted as authorizing preliminary relief, such relief
would have to be based on the court's inherent equity power,
which would require the use of the traditional (or reformulated)
"' Id. § 216(b).
" Id. § 216(c).
" Id. § 217.
" Richards, Monetary Awards in Equal Pay Act Litigation, 29 ARK. L. REv. 328,
329 (1975).
" 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1974).
15, Id. section 217 provides: "The district courts . . . shall have jurisdiction, for
cause shown, to restrain violations of [the EPA]."
'51 See Walling v. Wolff, 63 F. Supp. 605 (E.D.N.Y. 1945); Walling v. Peavy
Wilson Lumber Co., 49 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. La. 1943).
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equity standard or, in appropriate circumstances, the extraor-
dinary irreparable injury standard.'58
The conclusion that preliminary relief is not available in
employee actions to enforce the EPA is equally applicable to
actions by federal employees. The only significant difference in
the statutory framework when federal employees are aggrieved
is that the CSC has the responsibility for administering the
Act, except for certain classes of federal employees which re-
main the responsibility of the Secretary.'59 Certainly, nothing
in the FLSA suggests that equitable relief, whether preliminary
or permanent, is available in an action by a federal employee.
B. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
While the ADEA expressly incorporates the same enforce-
ment provisions used in the FLSA-EPA scheme, it makes four
important modifications. First, Section 7(c) of the ADEA pro-
vides that a nonfederal employee may bring an action for such
"legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this
Act."'8 0 Second, Section 15 of the ADEA establishes special
enforcement procedures for federal employees and, like Section
7(c), permits a federal employee to sue for "such legal or equi-
table relief as will effectuate the purposes of this Act." 6' Third,
Section 14(b) of the ADEA requires nonfederal employees, and
possibly the Secretary, to pursue any state administrative rem-
edy for a specified period prior to commencing an ADEA ac-
tion.' 2 Fourth, Section 7(d) of the ADEA establishes a federal
' See section I supra for a discussion of the standards governing the issuance of
preliminary relief.
'"' 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), (e)(2)(A) and (B), (r)(3), (s)(5), and (x); and § 204(f)
(Supp. 1975).
,s 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1974) (emphasis added).
Id. § 633a(c) (emphasis added).
,5 Id. § 633(b). While most courts view § 14(b) as requiring an employee to resort
to a qualified state agency prior to bringing a suit on the merits in federal court, a few
courts have interpreted the deferral provision as optional. Cases holding or implying
that deferral is required include: Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.
1975); Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974); Berry v. Crocker Nat'l
Bank, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 673 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Arnold v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 11
Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,786 (D. Hawaii 1975); Acford v. Exxon Corp., 12 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1500 (D. Conn. 1975). But see Smith v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 12 Fair Empl.




administrative period by requiring a nonfederal employee to
give 60days' notice to the Secretary before commencing litiga-
tion.'63
Given the first and second modifications it is clear that,
in contrast with the EPA, equitable relief is available to both
federal and nonfederal employees in ADEA actions comm-
enced after satisfaction of all applicable deferral and adminis-
trative requirements."4 Since these statutes appear to make
available any form of equitable relief which would "effectuate
the purposes" of the ADEA, the most reasonable interpretation
is that these statutes authorize both preliminary and perma-
nent equitable relief. Thus, when preliminary relief is sought
after satisfaction of deferral and administrative requirements,
the injunction must be regarded as statutory.
A more difficult problem is whether preliminary relief is
available to nonfederal employees during the state deferral and
federal administrative periods. While Sections 7(d) and 14(b)
provide that no action may be brought until these periods have
expired,'65 these prohibitions may be addressed only to ADEA
actions on the merits, not to actions for preliminary relief
premised upon the All Writs Act or upon the court's inherent
equity power. 6' Assuming that Sections 7(d) and 14(b) do not
In Dunlop v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 405 F. Supp. 774 (D. Md. 1976), it was held
that the deferral requirement does not apply to a § 17 action by the Secretary.
In 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1974). Cases holding that an employee cannot commence
an action on the merits during the administrative period include: Rucker v. Great
Scott Supermarkets, Inc., 528 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1976); Berry v. Crocker Nat'l Bank,
13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 673 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Acford v. Exxon Corp., 12 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1500 (D. Conn. 1975). Section 7(d) also requires that the notice to the
Secretary be given before the expiration of specified periods. If the notice is untimely,
an employee action is normally barred. See, e.g., Woodbum v. LTV Aerospace Corp.,
531 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1976); Law v. United Air Lines, Inc., 519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir.
1975); Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1975).
I" See Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1223 (D.N.M. 1974).
I' 29 U.S.C. 44 626(d), 633(b) (1974). Section 7(c), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1974),
which provides for such equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of the ADEA,
is undoubtedly applicable only in ADEA actions brought after the deferral and admin-
istrative periods have expired.
I" By analogy, consider that an EEOC right-to-sue letter or dismissal is a prere-
quisite for a Title VII suit on the merits. Yet, a number of courts have either held or
indicated that interim relief is available without satisfying this requirement. See text
accompanying notes 58-66 supra. But see Vaughan v. Chrysler Corli., 302 F. Supp. 143
(E.D. Mich. 1974), which held that preliminary relief is not available in an ADEA
action when the employee has failed to allege compliance with the notice and deferral
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preclude an employee from obtaining interim relief under these
theories, the problems which arise are similar to those pre-
viously discussed.' 7
A similar question is whether the Secretary may seek pre-
liminary relief without satisfying the state deferral require-
ment. The only judicial authority on point holds that the re-
quirement does not apply to actions by the Secretary under
Section 17 of the FLSA."81 But even if the requirement were
held applicable to Section 17 actions, it should not foreclose an
action by the Secretary based upon either the All Writs Act or
the court's inherent equity power. If the Secretary's action can
be brought under Section 17, the injunction probably would be
statutory, as previously indicated. 6 ' If the action is premised
on the All Writs Act or on the court's inherent equity power,
the problems relating to the availability of preliminary relief
and the governing standards are similar to those previously
discussed.7 0
Before discussing whether federal employees with age dis-
crimination claims can obtain interim relief during the federal
administrative phase,' it is first necessary to consider briefly
the procedures Section- 15 establishes for vindicating such
claims. After authorizing the Civil Service Commission to pro-
cess age discrimination complaints and to award appropriate
relief,'72 the Section provides that a federal employee who has
not filed a complaint with the CSC cannot commence an action
in federal court before he has given the CSC 30 days' notice of
his intent to sue. 73 Although the statute does not expressly
state when an employee who has filed a complaint with the
CSC can file suit, there are three possible interpretations of
requirements. However, the court did not consider whether such relief was available
under either the All Writs Act or the court's inherent equity power.
,8 See Sections I and II(A)(2) supra.
Dunlop v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 405 F. Supp. 774 (D. Md. 1976).
See notes 156-57 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the ability
of the Secretary to seek preliminary relief.
170 See section I supra for a discussion of the standards governing the issuance of
preliminary relief and, particularly, interim relief for individuals in § 706 proceedings.
171 Section 15, which provides a remedy for a federal employee who has experi-
enced age discrimination, does not require deferral to state authorities. 29 U.S.C. §
633(a) (1974).
"I Id. § 633a(b)(3).
,,3 Id. § 633a(d).
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when suit can be filed: Immediately after filing the complaint
with the CSC, 30 days after filing the complaint with the CSC,
or after the CSC has fully completed its processes. Thus, with
the exception of the first possible interpretation,' the proce-
dure for nonfiling federal employees and the procedure for fil-
ing federal employees both contain an administrative period
during which interim relief might be foreclosed.
The courts have yet to consider whether a federal em-
ployee can seek interim relief when he is unable to commence
an ADEA action on the merits because the administrative pe-
riod has not been satisfied. Arguably, the statutory scheme is
intended to preclude such litigation during this period. For
example, with regard to an employee who has not filed a com-
plaint with the CSC, Section 15(c) provides that "no civil ac-
tion may be commenced . . . under this section [until the 30
days' notice has been given]. '"'" On the other hand, neither
this provision nor any other in Section 15 appears to restrict
actions premised on the All Writs Act or on the court's equity
power.' Thus, interim relief should be available under either
of these two theories.
If a federal employee seeks preliminary relief premised on
the court's inherent equity power, there arises the question of
the proper standard by which to gauge the propriety of such
relief. Sampson v. Murray" suggests that the employee might
have to show extraordinary irreparable harm before prelimi-
nary relief can issue. But, again, the more stringent standard
was used in Murray because there were cogent reasons in that
case to hold preliminary relief entirely foreclosed. 8 These rea-
l" If a federal employee who has filed a complaint with the CSC can file an action
on the merits immediately thereafter, this procedure does not have an administrative
period during which preliminary relief might be precluded. Thus, if such an employee
files an action and requests preliminary relief, the availability of and standard govern-
ing such relief would present the same problems as previously discussed in connection
with ADEA actions which have been commenced after the deferral period has been
satisfied. See text accompanying note 164 supra.
"7 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d) (1974) (emphasis added).
'7, See sections I, H(A)(2) and (4) supra for discussion of these theories. Section
15(a), 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1974), which allows a court to issue such equitable relief
as will effectuate the purposes of the ADEA, appears applicable only when the action
has been commenced after expiration of any administrative period.
217 415 U.S. 61 (1974).
I" See notes 17-29 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Murray.
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sons have no application when preliminary relief is sought in
an action which involves substantive statutory rights which the
Congress has expressly charged the federal courts with the duty
of protecting. For this reason, the traditional (or reformulated)
equity standard would seem appropriate.
CONCLUSION
In employment discrimination actions, the availability of
preliminary relief and the showing necessary for its issuance
depend upon the particular type of action that is brought. In
several actions, such as one brought by the EEOC pursuant to
Section 706(f)(2) of Title VII, interim relief is authorized by
statute and governed by a statutory standard, which obviates
the need to show irreparable injury. At the other end of the
spectrum, there are actions where preliminary relief may sim-
ply be unavailable, regardless of the showing, as when an em-
ployee seeks such relief in an EPA action. Between these poles
are several other types of employment discrimination actions
where preliminary relief is available but where the controlling
standard depends on whether the relief is sought on the basis
of the All Writs Act or on the basis of the court's inherent
equity power and, if the latter, perhaps on whether the defen-
dant is a private employer or a state agency.
The single most difficult issue for the courts has been
whether federal preliminary relief may be obtained by an em-
ployee during the state and federal administrative phases of a
Title VII proceeding. Since this issue reveals an apparent clash
in the legislative policies and the statute provides little or no
guidance on how this clash is to be resolved, it is no surprise
that the courts are in disagreement. Nevertheless, there is rea-
son to believe that interim relief is available to an employee
during the administrative phases. The Supreme Court, in anal-
ogous circumstances, has indicated that such relief can be
based on either the court's inherent equity power or on the All
Writs Act. Under the first theory, interim relief should issue
when the employee has made a showing which satisfies the
traditional (or reformulated) equity standard. Under the sec-
ond theory, preliminary relief should issue upon a showing that
such relief is necessary to preserve the court's ability to issue
an effective remedy after deciding the case on the merits. How-
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ever, when such relief is sought during the state deferral period,
it may be necessary for the applicant to show that no adequate
relief is available from the state.

